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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(3 )(a) this civil appeal is within the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
This is the consolidation of two separate appeals: (a) one filed by Fox challenging 
the granting of the summary judgment in favor of Porter, and (b) another filed by Porter 
challenging the summary judgment dismissing Porter's claims against National based 
upon a Statute of Limitation and not holding that Rule 15(c) allowed relation back of an 
amended complaint to the date of the filing of the original complaint, and then the 
awarding of attorney's fees to National without apportioning between work done for Fox 
as opposed to work done for National. Fox is designated the Appellant. Porter is the 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant. National is the Cross-Appellee on Porter's "Cross" 
Appeal. 
Fox's Statement of Issues on Appeal Fails to Comply with U.RApp.P. Rule 
24(a)(5). Rule 24(a)(5) requires the statement of issues on appeal to cite to the record 
where the issue was preserved for appeal, and also requires an identification of the 
applicable standard of review for each issue. Fox has failed to satisfy either of these 
requirements. Its brief is procedurally deficient in this regard and should be stricken. 
1 
Porter's Statement of Issues Which are On Appeal. 
1. Was Judge Bohlmg Correct in Ruling that Fox's Memorandum in Support of the 
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Failed to Comply with the 
Requirements of Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 ? Preserved for Appeal in 
Porter's Reply Memorandum in Support of'Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 614- 654; 
and in oral argument at the hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 11, 
2002 R. 1261; and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy 
judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994). A trial court's ruling enforcing the 
requirements of CJA 4-501 shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. ("In 
addition, the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501. See 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (upholding 
trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept supplemental memoranda outside 
bounds of rule 4-501) Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Ut App 2003) 
2. Was Judge Bohlmg Correct in Ruling that Fox's Memorandum in Support of the 
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Failed to Properly Dispute 
Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts9 Presented for Appeal in Porter *s Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 614- 654: and in oral 
i 
argument at the hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 11, 2002 R. 1261; 
and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 
29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness 
standard. With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying 
facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is 
within the province of the appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] 
court's resolution of such questions of law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
3. Was it reversible error for Judge Bohling to conclude that Porter's Amended Complaint 
raising claims against National did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original 
Complaint under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? Presented for Appeal in 
Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp }s Motion for Summary 
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for 
summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect 
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential 
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of 
law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
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4. Was it reversible error for Judge Bohlmg to fail to find that the actions of Fox and the 
State of Utah to conceal the identity of the bond company tolled the statute of limitations? 
Preserved for Appeal in Porier 's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety 
Corp s Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second 
hearing on the motion for summcuy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect 
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential 
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of 
law/1 McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
5. Were their issues of fact as to whether Porter's actions in attempting to learn the identity 
of the bond company were reasonable which should have precluded the granting of summary 
judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral 
argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 
R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings 
for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 
(Utah 1998); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998;. 
"We consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly 
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concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., 970 
P.2dat 1277. 
6. Were their factual issues as to whether there were "exceptional circumstances that 
rendered the application of the statute of limitations unjust" which should have precluded 
granting summary judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summary? 
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for 
correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 
1998); Certified Stir. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider 
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., 970 P.2d at 1277. 
7. Were their issues of fact as to the closeness of the relationship between Fox and National, 
and whether and how much National knew about Porter's claims and lawsuit, which should have 
precluded granting summary judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59. 
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for 
correctness. Aurora Credit Sen's., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 
5 
1998); CerufiedSur. Group, Lid. v. UTJnc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider 
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Crcdu Sen's., 970 P.2d at 1277. 
8. Was it error for Judge Bohling to conclude that simply because the relationship between 
Fox and National was one of privity of contract, there could not be a sufficient closeness of 
relationship or identity of interest to warrant relation back under Rule 15(c)? Preserved for 
Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion 
for summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59; and in Porter's Motion for 
Relief from Summaiy Judgment, Memorandum in Support thereof and Reply 
Memorandum R. 926-945, 946-47, 1070-1076; and in the oral argument on said Motion 
for Relief from Summaiy Judgment on October 22, 2002 R. 1263. 
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for 
correctness. Aurora Credit Sews., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 
1998); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider 
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed 
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Sen's., 970 P.2d at 1277. 
9. Was it reversible error for the Court, pursuant to the Motion for Relief from Summaiy 
Judgment, to fail to hold (a) that there is always a close-enough relationship between a contractor 
and its surety to allow relation back, (b) that based upon the admissions of Floyd Cox presented 
to the Court, there was a sufficiently close relationship between Fox and its Surety to allow 
relation back, and/or (c) the issue of closeness of Fox and its Surety was at least disputed and 
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should have been determined by the trier of fact before the Court concluded that there should be 
no relationship back? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant National Surety Corp 3s Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral 
argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 
R. 1262:27-59; and in Porter's Motion for Relief from Summaiy Judgment, Memorandum 
in Support thereof and Reply Memorandum R. 926-945, 946-47, 1070-1076; and in the 
oral argument on said Motion for Relief from Summaiy Judgment on October 22, 2002 R. 
1263. 
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect 
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential 
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of 
law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
10. Was it reversible error for the Court to grant all of the fees requested by National's 
attorney's - even those incurred in defending Fox and not necessarily National? Preserved for 
Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees R. 895-901; and in the oral argument thereon at the hearing on 
October 22, 2002 R. 1263. 
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect 
7 
to mixed questions of law and fact, wc will review the underlying facts under the deferential 
clear error standard: however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the 
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of 
law."Mr/un v. Harch\ 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Fox's Brief Again Failed to Comply with U.R. App. P. Rule 24. Rule 24(a)(6) 
requires an appellant to set forth in his brief verbatim any and all detemiinative 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, mles and/or regulations. Fox's Appellant's 
Brief fails to do so, and should be stricken for non-compliance with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Determinative Rules. The following Rules are detemiinative: 
U.R.Ch.P, Rule 15(c) 
u(c) Relation hack of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to e set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading." 
U.R.Civ.P, Rule 56(c) 
"(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, maybe rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." (Emphasis added) 
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ILR.Civ.P, Rule 56(e) 
"(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. ... When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him." (Emphasis added) 
CJA 4-501(2)(B) 
"(B) Memorandum in opposition to the motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which 
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement." (Emphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the Fall of 1997, Porter and Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") entered 
into a written subcontract agreement for the construction of the University of Utah's 
Women's Gymnastic Training Center, wherein Porter was to provide specific work 
identified in the Subcontract - only those specific sections cited therein - for a total 
lump sum of $146,740.00, excluding any change orders. In October, 1997 Porter began 
performing the work required of it under the terms and scope of the parties' written 
agreement. 
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Soon after Porter began its work, Fox. through its supervisors and project manager 
Jeff Wood, began requesting that Porter perform additional work thai was clearly 
outside the scope of the parties' written subcontract. Porter continued to perfonii the 
work required of it under the parties' written agreement and also performed the 
additional work requested by Fox. 
In connection with all the work Porter was providing to the Project, it invoiced Fox 
approximately once a month, identifying by line item the work it had performed 
subsequent to the last invoice and the cost associated with each line item of work. 
Initially, Fox paid Porter for all the work it was providing, both inside and outside 
the scope of the parties' original written agreement. But within a few months, Fox 
stopped paying Porter according to the invoices submitted, and instead began falsely 
claiming that all the work being performed was under the parties' written agreement. 
Over the duration of the Project, Porter continued to perfonii all work required 
under the parties5 written agreement plus the additional work outside the scope of the 
written contract as requested by Fox, all the while attempting to negotiate with Fox and 
collect the amounts billed in Porter's invoices. Occasionally, Fox would admit that it 
owed Porter for the additional work and pay Porter accordingly. But, by the end of 
Porter's involvement on the Project, Fox ultimately refused to pay Porter for all the work 
that Porter had performed. Fox refused to pay the amounts still due under the parties' 
written agreement and refused to pay the amounts still due for the additional work outside 
10 
the scope of the written agreement that Porter performed at the request of Fox. The 
difference in the value of the work preformed by Porter and the amount paid by Fox was 
in excess of $160,000.00. As a result Porter was forced to initiate this lawsuit. 
Porter performed its last work on or about May 16, 1999. Gary Porter and his son, 
Mark Porter, contacted Fox and the State of Utah numerous times to try to leam the 
identity of Fox's bonding company. Porter's attorney also made numerous attempts to 
get this infonnation. It is undisputed that Porter made all of these attempts to get the 
bond information. It is also undisputed that neither Fox nor the State of Utah ever gave 
any bonding infonnation to Porter. From Porter's affidavits, it appears that Fox and the 
State deliberately withheld this infonnation from Porter. 
Porter filed his original complaint herein on or about Mary 16, 2000 without 
naming the bond company National because Porter had been wholly thwarted in its 
attempts to leam the identity of National. Fox's initial Rule 26(a) disclosures also did not 
disclose the bonding infonnation. It was not until after the one year statute of limitations 
for suing bonding companies was believed by Fox to have expired that Fox finally gave 
Porter the name of its bonding company. 
Porter filed a motion to amend to add National as a party, and to assert a claim on 
the bond. Fox's and National's attorneys did not oppose this motion to amend. Judge 
Bohling granted the motion to amend on February 28, 2001. Porter filed his amended 
complaint naming National on March 14, 2001. There is an issue of whether this waived 
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the statute of limitations claim/defense. 
National filed its motion for summary judgment, raising a statute of limitations 
defense. Porter opposed the motion, alleging that under Rule 15(c) the amended 
complaint should relate back and was therefore timely, that the discovery rule tolled the 
statute, that Fox and National had deliberately withheld the bonding information from 
Porter, and that extraordinary factors otherwise favored a refusal to enforce the statute of 
limitations. 
Porter filed its own motion for summary judgment for the monies due. In Porter's 
memorandum, Porter set forth in sixty-five (65) separate paragraphs a very detailed 
statement of undisputed facts supporting Porter's claims. The record submitted with the 
motion was over an inch think. Fox filed an "Objection" to the motion for summary 
judgment, and a Memorandum in Support of this Objection (collectively "Objection"). 
This opposing memorandum did not comply with CJA 4-501(2)(B) in that (a) it did not 
set forth verbatim all of Porter's statements of undisputed fact which Fox alleged were in 
dispute, and (b) it did not set forth next to each of said undisputed facts any facts 
supported by citations to the record which Fox believed disputed each of Porter's facts. 
Rather. Fox merely said that it "admitted" or "denied" Porter's facts number by number, 
with no evidentiary back up for the denials whatsoever. Fox then set forth certain 
"additional" disputed facts which did have citations to the record, but none of which 
were cross-referenced to Porter's statements of undisputed fact. 
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Porter filed a motion to strike this Objection because it was too late. Porter also 
filed a motion to strike the "additional" disputed facts on the grounds that these supposed 
"facts'" were without proper foundation or other evidentiary support. For instance, Floyd 
Cox tried to testify about matters which were only discussed, if at all, between Gary 
Porter and Fox's foreman, Jeff Wood. 
A hearing was held on these motions on April 29, 2002. After hearing argument 
on National's motion for summary judgment, Judge Bohling Riled that Porter's efforts to 
learn the identity of Fox's bonding company had not been diligent enough, that Porter 
knew that it likely had a bond claim and should have some how tried harder to learn the 
identify of the bonding company. Judge Bohling also ruled that since the relationship 
between Fox and National was only one of "privity of contract," Rule 15(c) would not 
allow relation back. Consequently, Judge Bohling granted National's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed Porter's claims against National. 
With respect to Porter's claims against Fox, Judge Bohling heard long and detailed 
argument as to (a) why Fox's Objection was deficient under CJA 4-501 (2)(B) and that 
Porter's statement of undisputed fact should be deemed admitted, and (b) why Fox's 
Objection nevertheless did not in reality dispute Porter's statement of undisputed fact. 
Judge Bohling took a fairly lengthy recess from the bench to consider these arguments. 
When Judge Bohling returned to the bench, he announced that: 
"I've had a chance to give considerable consideration to this motion brought here 
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by Portei. Theie is the issue that was raised fairly b) Porta that the defendant's 
mcmoiandum was untimely It w as untimely by a considerable period of time, yet the 
Court felt m the mteiest of justice that it should properly considei that memorandum. 
But hc\\ mg done so, the Court also believes that it should give a ver} high level of 
scrutiny to that memo and the requirements of Rule 4-501 subparagraph ... (2)(b). I '\ e 
done so, and its my view that the issues of fact that are being raised by the defendant, 
Fox, simply don't raise genuine issues of disputed fact, given the standards I have [to] 
apply undei 4-501(2)(c), and I believe that summary judgment should appropriately be 
granted. 
I don't even — I don't' find m those undisputed facts an issue of fact on [section] 
2300. There was an articulate argument made as to why there should be an issue of fact, 
but I don't find it m the memorandum, and it seems to me that the issues of - the 
assertions that have been made here by the plaintiff I asked to these various matters are 
appiopnately submitted to the Court without dispute and [the motion for summary 
judgment] should be granted." R 1262, pp 58 - 59. 
Both parties later filed motions to set aside these rulings. Porter filed his motion 
based upon the then just announced Nunez v Albo, 53 P. 3d 2 (UT App 2002) decision 
(which allow ed relation back for parties with only a privity of contract relationshipjand 
certain factual admissions/testimony obtained from Fox m a supplemental proceeding to 
the effect that Fox and National had an extiemel) close financial relationship and identity 
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of interest. Fox filed its motion to set aside based upon certain new affidavits of Floyd 
and Nellyn Cox (principals of Fox). Porter moved to strike these affidavits because they 
were still without foundation. Neither of the Coxes were involved in the negotiation of 
the Porter Subcontract, or the supervision of Porter's work. Neither of the Coxes are 
competent to testify about the matters that they attempted to raise in their new affidavits. 
Both parties requested an award of attorney's fees. 
A hearing was held on October 22, 2002. After argument, Judge Bohling denied 
both motions to set aside the summary judgments. In denying Porter's motion to set 
aside, Judge Bohling continued to rule that a privity of contract relationship simply cannot 
as a matter of law be close enough to allow relation back, despite the holding in Nunez. 
Judge Bohling also granted National almost all of the fees that it requested, 
without making any allocations for work performed on behalf of Fox and not National. 
Fox appealed the summary judgment in favor of Porter and against it. 
Porter appealed the summary judgment in favor of National, and the award of 
attorney's fees to National. 
The appeals were consolidated, and Fox has filed its Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") entered into a general contract with the 
University of Utah ("University") for the construction of the Women's Gymnastics 
Training Facility on the University's campus in Salt Lake City, Utah, (the 
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"Project") Fox's contract with the owner provides that Fox will "furnish labor, 
materials and equipment to complete the work as required m the Contract 
Documents . . ." Contract documents include the specifications found in the 
Project Manual. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 1 in P oner's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R. 396 - 552, 397 
2. In connection with the Project, Fox and Defendant National Surety Corporation 
("National") issued a Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor, 
equipment and material in connection with the Project. Statement of Undisputed 
Fact No. 2 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment 
R. 396-552, 398 
3. Fox entered into a written subcontract with Plaintiff Porter & Sons ("Porter"), 
under which Porter was to "furnish and install all materials, equipment and labor 
per plans, specification sections 02000, 02070, 02230, 02601, 02680, 02700 and 
02721 and addendums 1 and 2" for the sum of $146, 740.00. Statement of 
Undisputed Fact No. 3 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398 ( See Copy of Written Subcontract attached 
to said Memorandum as Exhibit C, at R. 423) 
4. This written subcontract excluded any change orders, and has an integration 
clause. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 4 in Porter's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398 
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5. Fox's Project Manager, Jeff Wood prepared the written subcontract between Fox 
and Porter. Statement ofUndisputed Fact No. 5 in Porter's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398. 
6. Porter performed all required work under the written Subcontract. Statement of 
Undisputed Fact No. 6 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398 
7. Fox has admitted that Porter performed all the work identified in specification 
sections 02230, 02700, and 02721 of the written Subcontract. Statement of 
Undisputed Fact No. 7 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398-99 
8. Specification section 02680 was mistakenly included in Porter's scope of work 
under the written Subcontract and pursuant to an oral agreement between Porter 
and Fox, Porter was instructed not provide any labor, equipment or materials 
covered under that specification section. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 8 in 
Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 
399 
9. In addition to the work performed under the written Subcontract, Porter was 
requested by Fox to perform additional work outside the scope of the written 
Subcontract. This included work under specification sections 02300 (Earthwork), 
02665 (Water Lines, Valves and Appurtenances) and 02711 (Foundation Drainage 
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Systems). The work performed by Porter under these sections was clearly outside 
the scope of the written subcontract and required the payment of additional 
compensation to Porter. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 in Porter's 
Memorandum in Support of Morion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399 
10. As Porter performed all the work required under the written Subcontract and the 
additional work requested by Fox, it invoiced Fox for such work, identifying line 
item by line item, the work performed and the associated cost for the work. 
Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 10 in Porrer 's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399 
11. Fox admitted that it received and reviewed all the invoices submitted by Porter. 
Statement of Undisputed Facr No. 11 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 5525 399 
12. Jeff Wood admitted that on several occasions he and Gary Porter discussed 
Porter's invoices and went through them line item by line item to make sure that 
Fox was properly paying Porter for the work Porter had done. Statement of 
Undisputed Fact No. 12 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399 
13. From November 1, 1997 and thereafter, Porter perfoniied work withm the scope of 
the Subcontract, and additional work outside of the scope of the Subcontract, and 
billed Fox for this work. Fox paid Porter for a large part of this work, all as set 
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forth m excruciating detail in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. 396 - 552, statements of undisputed facts 13-65, R. 400 -
409. 
14. Fox ceased paying Porter on Porter's invoices. Affidavit of Gary Porter, Exhibit Q 
to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment. R. 532 
15. Porter last provided labor, equipment and/or materials on the Project on or about 
May 16, 1999. Statement of Fact No. 2 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summaiy Judgment R 238-338, 
239 
16. Over the course of Porter's involvement on the Project, Porter and Fox had many 
disagreements over payment for work performed by Porter in connection with the 
Project. Statement of Fact No. 3 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summaiy Judgment R 23 8-338, 
239 
17. Prior to Porter sending a letter to the University of Utah wherein he requested 
Fox's Payment Bond information, Gary Porter spoke with Jeff Wood, Fox's 
Project Manager, and requested that Fox provide its Payment Bond information to 
Porter. Jeff Wood refused to provide the Payment Bond information, including 
whether a Payment Bond even existed. Statement of Fact No. 4 in Porter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment R 238-338, 239 
18. Porter then prepared and sent a letter to the Owner of the Project requesting that it 
provide Porter with Fox's Payment Bond information. This letter was also mailed 
to Fox. Statement of Fact No. 5 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summaiy Judgment R 238-338, 
239 
19. The owner received Porter's letter requesting the Payment Bond. In response the 
owner requested via e-mail, that the Project's architect speak with Fox's Floyd 
Cox and Jeff Wood about the matter prior to the owner releasing the Payment 
Bond information to Porter. See Statement of Fact No. 6 in Porter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R 238-338, 239 
20. Neither Fox nor the owner of the Project provided Porter with any infoiination 
relating to the Fox's Payment Bond. Statement of Fact No. 7 in Porter's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment R 238-338, 239 
21. Due to Fox's and the owner's failure to provide the Payment Bond information, 
Mark Porter spoke with Fox's Project Manager, Jeff Wood and requested the 
Payment Bond infoiination. Mr. Wood again refused to provide the infoiination to 
Mark Porter. Mark Porter also made numerous telephone calls to Fox's office 
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seeking to obtain the Payment Bond information. Fox failed to return any of Mark 
Porter's messages. Statement of Fact No. 8 in Porter's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summaiy Judgment 
R 238-338, 239 
22. During the early part of June, 1999, attorney Brian W. Steffensen attempted to 
contact Tom Christiansen of Campus Constmction and Design, the identified 
Owner of Utah Women's Gymnastic's Training Center Constmction Project to try 
to find out if Fox had posted a bond. Over a period of several weeks, Steffensen 
left 3 or 4 telephone messages with an individual which Steffensen understood to 
be a secretary or receptionist, requesting that she ask Mr. Christiansen to contact 
Steffensen if there was a bond in connection with the Project. R. 606-07 
23. As a result of Steffensen's several conversations with this woman, Steffensen 
understood that she or Mr. Christiansen would get back to Steffensen if there was 
in fact a bond posted by Fox. When she did not get back to Steffensen, he 
understood and therefore assumed that it was because there was no bond. R. 607 
24. Unaware of the existence of a Payment Bond, Porter filed suit against Fox on 
March 16, 2000. Thereafter, Fox continued its efforts to conceal the existence of 
the Payment Bond when it prepared and submitted to Porter its Rule 26 initial 
disclosures, stating that their was no insurance agreement at issue in the case. 
Only through discussions between the parties' counsel was Porter finally provided 
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a cop}' of the applicable Payment Bond. This information was not provided to 
Porter until after the applicable statute of limitations had run. Stat cm em of Fact 
No. 9 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety 
Corp 's Motion for Summary Judgment R 238-338, 240-41 
25. Thereafter, Porter filed its Motion to Amend its Complaint to include a claim 
against National Surety Corporation as surety on the Payment Bond. Fox's and 
National's attorneys did not object to the amendment adding National. 
Consequently, Porter's Motion was granted on February 28, 2001. See Minute 
Entiy Decision and Order, R. 46-47 
26. National filed its motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds 
on or about December 4, 2001. R. 111-162 
27. Porter filed his opposition to National's motion for summary judgment on January 
4,2002. R. 238-338 
28. National filed its Reply on January 14, 2003. R. 339-350 
29. Porter filed his motion for summary judgment against Fox on March 18, 2002. R. 
396-554 
30. Fox filed its "Objection'1 to Porter's motion for summary judgment on April 8, 
2002. R. 563-605 
31. Porter filed a Motion to Strike Fox's Objection to Porter's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on April 10, 2002. R. 608 - 613 
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32. Porter filed his Reply in support of his motion for summary judgment on April 10, 
2002, plus a motion to strike Fox's Additional Statement of Disputed Facts. R. 
614-656 
33. Judge Bohling heard oral argument on both motions on April 29, 2002 (continued 
from April 11, 2002), and granted them both. R. 663 
34. On June 6, 2002, Judge Bohling signed the Order Granting Porter Summary 
Judgment. R. 667-669 
35. On July 31, 2002, National moved for an award of attorney's fees. R. 839-876 
36. Porter opposed National's request for an award of attorney's fees which included 
all work done by the attorney's - even that done for Fox and not National, on 
August 12, 2002. R. 895-901 
37. On September 6, 2002, Porter filed his Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment 
Granted in Favor of Defendant National Surety Corporation. This motion was 
based upon the new Nunez v. Albo, 53 P. 3 (UT App 2002), case, and testimony 
acquired from Floyd Cox in a supplemental proceeding to the effect that Fox and 
National were very closely related economically and financially. R. 926-947 
38. National opposed Porter's motion for relief from judgment on September 19, 2002. 
R. 988-997 
39. Porter filed his Reply in support of his motion for relief from the National 
summary judgment on October 2, 2002. R. 1070-1076 
23 
40. Fox filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter summary judgment on 
October 11,2002. R. 1103-1100 
41. On October 18, 2002, Porter filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Fox's Rule 
60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter summary judgment. R. 1195-1211 
42. Porter also moved to strike the affidavits of Floyd Cox and Nellyn Cox in support 
of Fox's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter Summary Judgment on 
October 18, 2002 on the grounds that said affidavits did not have proper 
foundation. Neither of the Coxes were ever first hand participants in any of the 
factual occurrences relevant to Porter's work. R. 1212-1216 
43. Judge Bohling heard oral argument on the motions for relief from summary 
judgment on October 22, 2002, and denied them both. R. 1224 
44. Judge Bohling also granted National most of the attorney's fees that it requested. 
Ibid. 
45. Porter filed its Notice of Appeal on January 3, 2003. R. 1232-1239 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Porter filed its motion for summary judgment after the parties' depositions were 
taken because it knew then that Fox could not factually dispute Porter's claims. Porter's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts consisted of sixty-five detailed paragraphs - each 
supported with multiple citations to the record. It painted a painstaking picture of exactly 
what had occurred and how and why Porter was owed the money that it claimed. 
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When faced with such a detailed and fully supported motion for summary 
judgment, U.R.Civ.P. Rule 56 and CJA 4-501(2)(B) placed a heavy burden upon Fox to 
directly and adequately dispute each and every material fact set forth in Porter's statement 
of undisputed facts. Fox did not - and in reality could not - dispute Porter's facts. Judge 
Bohling was correct when he granted the motion for two reasons: (a) the failure to comply 
with CJA 4-501(2)(B) required Judge Bohling to deem Porter's statement of undisputed 
fact to be admitted, and (b) substantively Fox's attempt to dispute Porter's facts fell 
woefully short. The only thing Fox did was try to claim that section 02300 of the 
Project's plans and specifications was mistakenly left out of the contract. But this 
assertion was without factual basis in the record. This was one of those unique occasions 
where the defendant literally could not - and did not - dispute the material facts. 
Summary Judgment against Fox was entirely appropriate. 
With respect to National, Porter's argument is simple: Judge Bohling's ruling as a 
matter of law that a "privity of contract" relationship is never sufficient to allow an 
amendment to relate back is simply incorrect. The Nunez and Penrose cases clearly hold 
otherwise. Further, the admissions as to the closeness of the financial relationship and 
identity of interest between Fox and National should have ended the discussion and 
supported a finding that there was a sufficient identity of interest to allow - nay require -
relation back. Further, Fox's (and essentially National's) deliberate hiding of the identity 
of National should have barred a statute of limitations defense. Finally, the issue of 
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whether Porter had been diligent enough in its attempts to determine the name of the 
bonding company was factual in nature and should have been left to the jury. 
Under facts suggesting deliberate hiding of the name of the bonding company, and 
m face of Porter's extensive unsuccessful attempts to learn the identity of National, it was 
simply inequitable and unfair to allow the statute of limitations to bar Porter's bond 
claims. 
Lastly, the Court should have apportioned Babcock's attorney's fees between Fox 
and National and not awarded fees for work perfomied primarily on behalf of Fox and not 
National. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST FOX WAS FAIR AND JUST IN ALL 
RESPECTS AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Fox Did Not Comply with CJA 4-501(2)08). The requirements of CJA 4-
501(2)(B) are clear: 
"(B) Memorandum in opposition to the motion. The points and authorities in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim 
restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the 
party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and property 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement." (Emphasis added) 
Fox's "Objection" to Porter's Motion was clearly deficient because: 
a. Fox's Objection did not set forth a \ erbathn restatement of each of Porter's 
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statements of fact about which Fox asserted there was dispute; 
b. Fox did not follow each verbatim restatement of Porter's statements of undisputed 
fact with a concise statement of material facts which support Fox's contention that 
the "undisputed" facts were disputed. 
Because of these failures, Fox's Objection is a perfect example of exactly what CJA 4-
501(2)(B) was designed to preclude. Fox's failure to comply forced Judge Bohling to 
sift through each and every one of Fox's "additional facts" to try to determine if, how 
and/or why each such "additional facts" might some how dispute one or more of Porter's 
statements of undisputed fact. This was exactly the problem that the trial court in Fennell 
v. Green, 77 P.3d 339 (Ut App 2003) faced when a party failed to comply with CJA 4-
501. 
It is clear that Fennell failed to comply with the rule. He did not refer to 
Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only his own 
statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what facts Fennell 
contended were disputed." Fennell, at 342. (Emphasis added) 
CJA 4-501(2)(B) was designed to assist the Court in determining exactly what the 
opposing party considered to be the disputed facts. The Fennell court quoted the Utah 
Supreme Court when it reaffirmed the proposition that parties are required to comply with 
the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
The Utah Supreme Court... recently emphasized the importance of 
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration in Lovendahl v. Jordan 
School District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705.[fn3] In Lovendahl the plaintiff sued 
for damages under a claim for inverse condemnation. See id. at ^ 48. The 
defendant's summary judgment motion and supporting memorandum included 
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facts and arguments that the plaintiff, in opposing the summar\ judgment motion, 
did not address. See icL at ^J 50. The court noted that under rule 4-501 (2)(B) 
"all facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summan judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing part) fs statement.fM Lovendahl 2002 UT 130 at <]fl[ 50 (quoting Utah R. 
Jud.Admm. 4-501 (2)(B)). ... 
In addition, the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with rule 4-501. 
See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) 
(upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept supplemental 
memoranda outside bounds of rule 4-501). Utah courts have repeatedly upheld 
the necessity of compliance with the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
See id.; see also Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P.2d 142. 148 (Utah 
1995) (determining that failure to comply with rule 4-501 made additional filings 
moot); cf. Price v. Ami our, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (finding trial court 
erred m not complying with rule 4-501 but affirming because error was harmless); 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,1fl[ 14, 982 P.2d 586 (reversing trial 
court where it did not follow notice requirement of rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration). See generally Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 497 n. 3 
(Utah 1998) (affirming trial court on other grounds but noting plaintiffs response 
to motion for summary judgment failed to conform with rule 4-501 because it 
failed to set forth disputed facts and did not contain numbered sentences). 
Due to Non Compliance with CJA 4-501, Porter's Statement of Undisputed 
Facts Became "Deemed Admitted." The last part of CJA 4-501 clearly states that 
failure to dispute a statement of undisputed facts properly "shall" result in those 
"undisputed facts" being deemed admitted. The Utah Supreme Court so held in 
Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130. Judge Bohlmg did not have any discretion to ignore these 
requirements. Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts had to be deemed admitted, and 
the motion for summary judgment based thereon granted. 
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Judge Bohling Reviewed Fox's Objection and Determined that it 
Substantively Did Not Dispute Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts. Judge 
Bohling was conscientious and did not want to grant summary judgment against Fox 
unless the material facts really were not disputed. Judge Bohling clearly went the extra 
mile and exhaustively reviewed the parties' memoranda. After that exhaustive review, 
Judge Bohling came to the conclusion that Fox had not in fact disputed Porter's Statement 
of Undisputed Facts with citations to real, hard admissible evidence. Fox had tried to say 
"denied55 to many of the statements, but that clearly is not sufficient without much more. 
Judge Bohling5s conclusion was entirely accurate. Fox tried to argue that Floyd 
Cox testified in his deposition that the work required under Section 02300 of the plans 
and specifications for the project - which Section clearly is not included in the written 
subcontract - was mistakenly left out of the subcontract. That appears to be the main 
position that Fox tried to espouse in its Objection. Unfortunately for Fox, the evidence 
actually adduced in this case was clear and did not support any such assertion. Cox did 
not have personal laiowledge of any of this because he did not negotiate the contract, did 
not draft it and did not supervise Porter's work. Fox's foreman - Jeff Wood (who is the 
only person who did have personal laiowledge of the relevant facts) - did not so testify in 
his deposition. The lack of admissible evidence to dispute Porter's Undisputed Facts led 
Judge Bohling to conclude from the bench that although Fox's attorneys had argued 
valiantly for the Court to so find, there simply was no evidence set forth in the Objection 
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to support such a conclusion. R. 12(>2,k pp. 58-59 
Consequently, Judge Holding's Decision to Grant Summary Judgment 
Against Fox and in Favor of Porter is Supported by Two Separate and Legally 
Sufficient Bases. The order signed by Judge Bohling states that the summary judgment 
was granted based upon two separate and legally sufficient reasons. First, the deemed 
admitted statements of undisputed fact arising from the operation of 4-501(2)(B); and 
Second, the determination that substantively the Objection did not in actuality dispute 
Porter's statement of undisputed facts. If this Court of Appeals undertakes the same 
exhaustive effort that Judge Bohling did, it will quickly reach the same conclusion. 
But it is important to note that Judge Bohling had absolute discretion to require 
Fox to comply with CJA 4-501(2)(B), and based upon Fox's failure to so comply, to 
deem Porter's statement of undisputed facts to be admitted. These mlings and/or actions 
by Judge Bohling are well within the bounds of his discretion and are therefore 
unassailable on this appeal. 
The Summary Judgment was proper and fair. Porter's marshaling of the evidence 
in support of its position as set forth in the statement of undisputed facts was detailed, 
comprehensive and compelling. There can be no real doubt but that Porter is in every 
way fully entitled to the judgment which was rendered in its favor. It is consistent with 
the written subcontract, the admitted changes orders and admitted requests for additional 
work. Fox's defense thereto was at all times somewhat desperate and contrived. Fox's 
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appeal in these regards should be entirely dismissed and Judge Bohling's corresponding 
rulings affirmed. 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF NATIONAL SHOULD BE 
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED AGAINST NATIONAL 
AND IN FAVOR OF PORTER ON THE BOND 
URCivP Rule 15(c) Allows Amendments to Relate Back in Time to the Filing of the 
Original Complaint. Porter's last work was on May 16, 1999. Porter filed his origmal 
complaint in March of 2000. If the amended complaint adding National were allowed to relate 
back, it would have been timely. 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part, that "Whenever 
the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original pleading." URCivP 15(c). "Relation back is allowed under the 
rules even if a statute of limitations has run during the intervening time." Meyers v. Interwest 
Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981). "hi considering motions to amend pleadings, primary 
considerations are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any 
party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage." Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 
1981); See also, Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new 
parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings. But, the Utah Supreme Court 
has made an exception to the general rule. "The exception operates where there is a relation 
back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so 
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it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial." Sulzcn v Wilhams,911 P.2d 
497, 501 (Utah App. 1009) quoting, Do\n-Lavton Co v. Clark 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
li has been further held, that parties have an identity of interest when "the real parties in interest 
were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early 
stage." Doxer-Lavton Co , 548 P.2d at 906. Cf. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263. 265 
(Utah 1995) (noting that identity of interest exists when existing parties and those sought to be 
added are so closely related "that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the 
action to the other") (citation omitted). 
In this case, Porter argued initially in opposition to National's motion for summary 
judgment that it is clear that Fox and National have the identity of interest necessary to relate 
Porter's Amended Complaint back to the date of its original complaint, hi connection with Fox 
becoming the general contractor for the Project, Fox as Principal and National as surety, issued a 
Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in connection with the 
Project. According to the Payment Bond, both Defendants are jointly and severally liable. Their 
economic fates on this project are entirely identical. They are joined at the economic hip. 
However, Judge Bohling granted National's motion, Riling that: 
'Tinning first to the relation back doctrine, it is well-established that the filing of 
an amended complaint generally will relate back to the date of the filing of the 
original complaint only when the amendment does not add a new party. If, 
however, a party is added, but the new and old parties are 'so closely related in 
their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide 
notice of the action to the other/ then an exception applies, and relation back is 
allowed. See, Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P. 2d 367 (Utah 1996) at 368; 
and Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P. 2d 214 (Utah 1984) at 216. To 
determine whether this exception applies here requires an examination of the 
relationship between Fox and NSC. The identity of interest between these 
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parties, as it turns out, is privity of contract. It is clear, as held in Perry, that 
such a relationship is an insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation 
back. Id. Thus, plaintiffs action in filing the claim adding NSC as a party does 
not relate back to the filing date of the original Complaint under Rule 15." 
(Emphasis added) R. 793-94 
Judge Bohling's written ruling sets forth all of the case law and principles that 
Porter was relying on, but then it suddenly concludes that "privity of contract" equals (or 
requires a finding of) "insufficient identity of interest." 
The Court based its ruling on its reading of the Utah Supreme Court decision of 
Periy v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). In Periy, a third party 
plaintiff had subcontracted to furnish doors and millwork on a constmction project. Perry 
ordered the doors from the supplier, which then ordered the doors from the manufacturer. 
Following suit by the general contractor against Peny for breach of contract arising from 
a claim that the doors were defective, Perry filed his third party complaint against the 
supplier and manufacturer alleging they had breached their warranties. Id. at 216. Periy's 
third party complaint was filed more than five years after the doors were delivered to 
Perry. Id. 
The trial court in Perry granted the supplier's and manufacturer's motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that Perry's claims were barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations. 
On appeal, Peny argued that pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 15(c) his third party complaint should relate 
back to the filing of the original complaint. The Utah Supreme Court mled against Peny, finding 
that there was no "identity of interest" between the original plaintiff (the general contractor), 
Peny (the door subcontractor) and the third party defendants (the door supplier and 
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manufacturer). The Supreme Court stated that "c[i]dentit> of interest1 as used . . . means that the 
parties arc so closely related m their business operations that notice of that action against one 
serves as notice of the action to the other." Id. At 217. Other than being in "privity of contract," 
there was no close relationship between the original parties and those sought to be amended in. 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the summary judgment which dismissed the 
complaint against the supplier and manufacturer. Id. At 217. 
So, under Perry it is clear that a mere "privity of contract" relationship is not enough to 
meet the "identity of interest" standard. But it is Porter's belief that Perry did not stand for the 
proposition that parties in a "privity of contract" relationship could never meet the "identity of 
interest" standard as was found by Judge Bohling. 
Nunez v. Albo, 53 P. 3d 2 (Ut App 2002) appeared to resolve this issue, making it 
absolutely clear that parties in "privity of contract" most definitely can have the "identity 
of interest" necessary to allow relation back for amendment purposes. Even if the 
relationship is one of "privity of contract," it can nevertheless be sufficiently close that 
notice of the proceedings to one party would be tantamount to notice of the proceedings 
to the other party. The issue is whether it can be assumed (from the closeness of the 
relationship) or proven (from the specific facts in the case), that the party sought to be 
amended in was "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings or [was] involved in them 
unofficially from an early stage." Nunez at j^ 29 (See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 
902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
In Nunez, a patient brought a medical malpractice action against her physician in 
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connection with treatment that she received for spider veins. Following the expiration of 
the statute of limitations, the patient sought to amend her complaint to add the physician's 
employer, the state university where the physician served as a faculty member. Id. at ^ [ 
1-6. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion to amend on the grounds that the 
relationship between the physician and his employer was one of "privity of contract." 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her amended complaint adding the university 
as a defendant related back to her original complaint because the employer-employee 
relationship was close enough, and the university employer had in fact known of the 
lawsuit, such that it could be presumed and in fact proven that the university had notice of 
the proceedings and would not therefore be prejudiced. The Utah Court of Appeals 
agreed, and overruled the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs 
amended complaint related back to the date of her original complaint due to the "identity 
of interest" between the physician and university. This "identity of interest" between the 
physician and the university was based upon the contract of employment between the 
physician and the university and the university's involvement in the proceedings 
unofficially from an early stage, including providing counsel for the physician and 
communications made by the university to plaintiff. 
Thus, Nunez makes it clear that the closeness of relationship between the new and 
old parties is the point of examination for the court; if that relationship is close enough 
such that the new party was sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, whether officially or 
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unofficially, from an early stage then there will be found a sufficient identity of 
interest" between the new and old parties such that relation back of the amended 
complaint is not prejudicial. Nunez further clarifies that parties in privity of contract can 
be so closely related that they have a sufficient 'identity of interest" so as to allow 
relation back. 
Porter was thrilled, therefore, when the Court of Appeals decided Nunez and ruled 
in a "privity of contract1' case there could be a sufficient identify of interest between 
parties who were only in "privity of contract51 to allow an amended complaint to relate 
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint therein. 
Porter was also thrilled when Floyd Cox, appearing as president of Fox Construction at 
an examination at Porter's counseFs office on September 5, 2002, testified about the closeness of 
the relationship between bond companies - surety companies ~ and contractors in general, and 
the specific relationship between Fox and National. After testifying that Fox would submit 
formal, audited fmancials to National at least once each year, Cox testified as follows: 
"Q.(By Mr. Steffensen) And that was as your counsel indicated, you supplied that 
[(fmancials)] yearly as a condition? 
A. (Cox) Yes. 
Q. Did you have any obligations in connection with your agreements with the bond 
company to notify them if there was any change in condition during the course of a year, such as 
that the fmancials submitted previously would not be accurate? 
A. i would meet with the bonding agents and representatives of the [Fireman's bond] 
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companies at least two or three times a year, and they were very well aware of the financial 
situation during the year, what was happening with Fox Construction. 
Mr. Steffensen: And I assume that's because counsel probably would agree that my 
observation of the relationship between a contractor and a bonding company is one of 
almost economic carnal knowledge of one another. Would you agree with that, counsel? 
Mr. Price [counsel for Fox]: I've never heard it quite described that way. 
The Witness [Floyd Cox]: I think that describes it well. 
Q. (Mr. Steffensen) Does that describe it well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean, they expect to "know" you in the Biblical sense as to your financial 
condition? 
A. Let's put it this way: They pretty much knew when I cut my fingernails, yes. 
Q. Okay. And then did you have obligations to keep them informed as to what was 
happening on the jobs, claims and things? 
A. Absolutely, yes. And it was their obligation to check, and check with the owners. It 
was typical procedure for them. 
Q. And that's what you did on all of the projects you had during your relationship with 
National Surety? 
A. That's correct." (Transcript of Supp. Order Examination of Floyd Cox, Sept. 5, 
2002; 10:1 - 11:17). {Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief From Summary 
Judgment Granted in Favor of National Surety Corporation, R. 965 
Fox admitted, with National's attorney present, that the relationship between Fox and 
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National was one of "economic carnal knowledge," that National "kneV* Fox m the Biblical 
sense as to Fox' financial condition, that National kne\A when Cox/Fox "cut [his] fingernails," 
that Fox had an obligation to keep National mfonned of "claims and things" on the jobs, and that 
National had an "obligation to check [for claims/problems on thejobs], and check with the 
owners. It was typical procedure for [National]." The relationship between Fox and National 
was an economic/financial "marriage." National had as much notice and/or control over Fox as 
does a parent corporation over a subsidiary, or a subsidiary corporation over a sister subsidiary 
corporation. One cannot imagine a more close "economic relationship" than this. It is certainly 
as close, if not closer, than the employee/employer relationship which Nunez found sufficient to 
allow relation back. Based upon these admissions, and the commonly known practices in the 
construction industry, this Court should rule as a matter of law that the contractor/principal and 
surety relationship is always sufficiently close to meet the "identity of interest'1 standard with 
respect to bond claims. Under the description of the relationship described by Cox above, notice 
of claims is contractually required to be given by the principal/contractor. Further, National had 
a pattern and practice of independently monitoring the status of claims on a job, and to check 
with the owner (in this case, the State of Utah) to learn about claims. From these facts, it can be 
presumed that notice to Fox and the State of Utah was notice to National. At the very least there 
are critical factual issues here which should have precluded granting summary judgment. 
Porter argued in its motion for relief based upon the Nunez case, and this new 
evidence that the relationship between Fox and National was exactly the type where there 
should be found an Identity of Interest, that the summary judgment in favor of National 
should be set side. Judge Bohling summarily rejected these arguments, ruling again that 
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since there was a "privity of contract' relationship between Fox and National, there was 
still an insufficient identity of interest. 
Porter believes that these rulings by Judge Bohling were clearly erroneous -
especially in light of the recent decision in Penrose v. Ross, 71 P.3d 631 (Ut App. 2003). 
Although an identity of interest was not found in that case, the Court's discussion of the 
analysis to be followed in detennining if there is an identity of interest is very instmctive: 
"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs the relation back of 
amendments, stating: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading." Id 
Rule 15(c) further "allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original 
complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of limitations." 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). Generally, 
however, rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or 
adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original 
pleadings. . . . There is an exception to this rule. The exception operates 
where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new 
and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or 
proved the relation back is not prejudicial. The rationale underpinning 
this exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of 
limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim. Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added); see also Vina v. 
Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) 
(applying identity of interest rule laid out in Doxey-Layton). "An identity 
of interest exists "when "the real parties in interest were sufficiently 
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from 
an early stage.'"" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247>, ffif 29, <53 P.3d 2> 
(quoting Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, ffif 14, 977 P.2d 497 
(quoting Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 906)), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 
2002). 
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Having determined that the present case is not a misnomer case, we next 
determine whether a true identity of interest exists, permitting the 
amended complain! to relate hack. If an identity of interest is established, 
a party general])7 cannot be prejudiced. See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (stating amendment permitted "where there is a 
relation back, . . . when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it 
can be assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial"); Vina v. 
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) 
(same). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "identity" as "|t]he identical nature of 
two or more things." Black's Law Dictionary 748 (7th ed. 1999). Webster's 
defines identity as Page 636 "sameness of essential or generic character 
in different instances" and "the condition of being the same with 
something described or asserted." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 597 (1986). Therefore, an identity of interest requires parties 
to have the "same" interest. This definition is supported by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 
1277, 1294 (1937). In Pomeroy, the issue before the court was whether a 
final judgment as to one issue in a case with multiple parties was effective 
as to all parties for the purpose of an appeal.[fn4] See id. at 1294. The court 
applied the "identity of interest" test, which it defined as "whether the 
determination of the issues as to any defendant depends on or affects 
the determination of the issues as to the other defendants.n[fn5] IcL 
Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, this court 
determined that an identity of interest existed between an employer and an 
employee, permit an amendment to the complaint adding the employer as a 
party to the complaint. In Nunez, a malpractice action was filed against a 
physician alleging damages caused by the physician's performance of a 
medical treatment. See id. at ^ 5. Nunez filed a motion to amend the 
complaint to name the physician's employer, the University of Utah 
Hospital (Hospital), as a defendant. See id. at f^lffl 5-6. The trial court 
denied Nunez's motion and she appealed. See id. at *[fl] 6. In determining 
whether the amended complaint related back to the original complaint, this 
court analyzed rule 15(c) and cases outlining the exception permitting the 
addition of parties where an identity of interest is established. See id. at ^f 
29. 
We held that an identity of interest existed between the Hospital and 
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the physician because the cause of action ""arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading/" Id. 
(quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 15(c)). This court also noted that the Hospital 
had potential vicarious liability as the employer of the physician. See id. 
at fflnffl 27-34. Further, the University provided legal counsel for the 
physician, asserting that the physician was acting within the scope of his 
employment by the Hospital and was entitled to the protections of the 
Governmental Immunity Act.[fn6] See id. 
In Nunez, any disposition of the case against the physician would 
necessarily affect the Hospitals liability. Thus, an identity of interest 
existed because the legal position and defenses of the two parties were 
the "same." 
The legal positions and defenses of Fox and National in this case are likewise the 
"same." They are co-obligors with Fox. If Fox is found liable to Porter, then National is 
liable to Porter. The interests of a principal and surety on all construction jobs - with 
respect to bond claims, are always identical. With respect to payment lawsuits, they 
always have an identity of interest. 
The Discovery Rule Tolled the Payment Bond Statute of Limitations. 
In addition to Rule 15 permitting Porter's Amended Complaint to relate back to the 
date of the original Complaint, Porter asserted that the statute of limitations on Porter's 
Payment Bond claim was tolled pursuant to the discovery rale. The discovery rale is a 
judicially created doctrine which functions as an exception to the normal application of a 
statue of limitations. Under the discovery rale, "the statute of limitation does not begin to 
run until the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action." Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 
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1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has enumerated three situations in 
which the application of the discover) rule is appropriate: (1) where the application of the 
rule is mandated by statute; (2) where the plaintiff is unaware of a cause of action because 
of the defendant's misleading conduct or concealment; and (3) where application is 
warranted by the existence of special circumstances that would, based on a balancing test, 
render application of the statue of limitations unjust or irrational. Id. at 1285. In the 
instant case, the discovery rule should toll the one year statute of limitation on Porter's 
Payment Bond cause of action due to Fox's concealment of information pertinent to the 
existence of its Payment Bond, and the existence of special circumstances rendering the 
statute of limitations unjust and irrational. 
a. Fox/National Concealed the Payment Bond Information from 
Porter. 
In order to toll the statute of limitations under the concealment prong of the 
discovery rale, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the defendant actively 
concealed the existence of a cause of action, and that given defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier. See, Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996); Horn v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 
95, 102 (Utah App. 1998). In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "weighing 
the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light of the defendant's steps to conceal 
the cause of action necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary 
judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Berenda, at 54. Furthermore, it has held that 
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when an agency or privity relationship exists between the third party concealing the cause 
of action and another defendant, the concealment can be imputed to the defendant if the 
agent acts in whole or in part to cany out the purposes of the principal. Hodges v. Gibson 
Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). 
In the instant case, the undisputed facts show that Fox actively concealed the 
existence of the Payment Bond and identity of its surety such that Porter could not have 
reasonably discovered the claim earlier. Or, at the very least a genuine issue of material 
fact exists regarding Fox's concealment. The undisputed material facts also 
demonstrate a relationship between Fox and National such that Fox's conduct in 
concealing the Payment Bond information should be imputed to National. As such, 
National's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
Porter's last work was performed on May 16, 1999. Porter and Fox attempted to 
negotiate the settlement of their payment disputes. Ultimately, these settlement 
negotiations broke down in the spring of 1999. Thereafter, Gary Porter spoke with Fox's 
Project Manager, Jeff Wood and requested that Fox provide Porter with Fox's Payment 
Bond infomiation. Jeff Wood refused to provide Porter with any infomiation relating to 
the Payment Bond, including whether such bond even existed. As a result of Fox's 
refusal, Porter sent a letter to the owner of the Project on April 23, 1999. Pursuant to the 
letter, Porter sought infomiation relating to Fox's Payment Bond in order to make a claim. 
This letter was also sent to Fox. That very same day, Tom Christensen (Utah State 
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Employee) sent an e-mail to Jill Jones of AJC Architects acknowledging that he had 
received the letter from Porter and requested that she discuss this matter with Fox before 
the University released the Payment Bond information. Neither the owner nor Fox 
provided Porter with information relating to the Payment Bond following Porter's written 
request. Thereafter and due to their failure to provide the information requested, Mark 
Porter had a discussion with Jeff Wood in May of 1999, wherein another demand was 
made that Fox provide its Payment Bond information. Again, Jeff Wood refused to 
provide the information. Porter's attorney also attempted unsuccessfully to get the 
Payment Bond information. 
Due to Fox's concealment of the existence of a Payment Bond, Porter wras 
unaware of the facts forming the basis for a cause of action upon the Payment Bond. 
Therefore, Porter filed this instant action against Fox on March 16, 2001. On or about 
May 31, 2000, Fox further attempted to conceal the existence of the Payment Bond by 
indicating in its Rule 26 Initial Disclosures that there were no insurance agreements at 
issue in the case. Then, following the expiration of the statute of limitations governing 
claims upon payment bonds, Fox finally provided Porter with a copy of the Payment 
Bond. This was the first time Porter discovered the facts necessary to form the basis of 
his cause of action against Surety upon the Payment Bond. Porter then obtained leave 
from the Court to amend its Complaint to assert its claim upon the Payment Bond. 
These facts are sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Fox took affirmative 
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steps to conceal the existence of a cause of action upon the Payment Bond. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-56-38(1) provides that when a construction contract is awarded 
under Utah's Procurement Code, the contractor [Fox] to whom the contract is awarded 
shall deliver a payment bond to the state that is in an amount equal to 100% of the price 
specified in the contract and is executed by a surety company authorized to do business in 
Utah, which is for the protection of each person supplying labor, equipment, or material 
for the performance of the work provided for in the contract. Additionally, the statute 
permits the waiver of a Payment Bond by the state. Thus, the first element necessary to 
maintain a cause of action upon a Payment Bond, is the existence of a Payment Bond. 
Due to Fox's active concealment, Porter was unable to discover the existence of Fox's 
Payment Bond until after it filed suit against Fox in March of 2000, still within one year 
of last time labor, equipment or materials were supplied to the Project. Even after Porter 
filed suit, Fox continued to conceal the existence of the Payment Bond until after the 
statute of limitations had expired. Upon receipt of the Payment Bond information, Porter 
finally had facts forming the basis of its cause of action and obtained leave to amend its 
complaint to allege a cause of action upon the Payment Bond. 
Furthermore, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Fox's conduct of concealing 
the information should be imputed to National. Fox and National bound themselves to 
the University of Utah such that they were both jointly and severally liable to all 
claimants supplying labor or materials provided for under Fox's contract with the 
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University of Utah. Furthermore. Fox's conduct was at least in part, clearJy furthering the 
purposes of National by reducing the potential number of claims it could be jointly and 
severally liable upon under the Payment Bond. As a result of this relationship, Fox's 
concealment of the existence of the Payment Bond and the identity of National should be 
imputed to National. Thus, the one year statute of limitations should have been tolled and 
Porter's claim upon the Payment Bond should be permitted or at the very least a genuine 
issue of material fact is present which should have prevented the Court from detemiining 
the date the statute of limitations began to ran. In either event, National's motion should 
have been denied. 
b. Special Circumstances Exist Rendering the Statute of 
Limitations Unjust and Irrational. 
Similar to the rational in preventing one party from escaping liability due to 
a party's conduct of concealing facts necessary to form the basis of a cause of action, the 
discovery rule will toll the statute of limitations when special circumstances exist 
rendering the statute unjust and irrational regardless of any showing that the defendant 
has prevented discovery of the cause of action. Porter asserts that the material facts 
demonstrate that under the circumstances, application of the statute of limitations is 
unjust and irrational. 
"The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances 
that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust [turns on] a 
balancing test.'* Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 776 (Utah App. 1998); quoting 
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Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). In this 
balancing test, the Court must weigh the hardship imposed on the claimant by the 
application of the statute of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the passage of time. Id. Some factors the court considers in applying this balancing 
test include: (1) whether the defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are 
greater than the plaintiffs; (2) whether the defendant performed a technical service that 
the plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate; and (3) whether the claim 
has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the 
parties cannot remember basic events. Sevy at 636. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that before reaching this balancing test "the plaintiff must first show that the 
plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the 
cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Id. citing Warren v. 
Provo City Corp. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). This latter issue of plaintiff s 
discovery is a question of fact. Sevy at 634. 
As demonstrated above, in order to maintain an action upon a Payment Bond, such 
a bond must have been issued. In the instant case, the material facts demonstrate that 
Porter did not know whether Fox had obtained a Payment Bond until after June 29, 2000, 
approximately one and one half months after the statute of limitations had expired. The 
material facts further demonstrate that Porter made reasonable attempts to discover the 
existence of the Payment Bond from both Fox and the owner of the Project prior to the 
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expiration of the statute of limitations but that Fox willfully concealed the Payment Bond 
information from Porter. As such, Porter filed the instant action against Fox in March of 
2000 and sought to discover the Payment Bond information through the initial disclosure 
phase of discovery. Even after Porter filed the instant action, Fox continued in its efforts 
to conceal the payment Bond information by stating that no insurance agreements were 
applicable to this case. Thereafter, Fox finally disclosed the Payment Bond information 
after the statute of limitations had run. Upon discovery that Fox had obtained a Payment 
Bond, Porter amended its Complaint to assert a cause of action thereon. 
Based upon these material facts, Porter did not discover the facts forming the basis 
of its cause of action until Fox came clean on or about June 29, 2000. after the statute of 
limitations had run. If the applicable statute of limitations continues to be imposed, 
Porter will be precluded from obtaining redress from the party who insured that Fox 
would pay for all labor and materials provided to the Project. Porter has a judgment 
against Fox, but Fox can't pay. This unjust application of the statute of limitations would 
allow Fox and National to reap the benefits of Fox's willful concealment and open the 
door to future similar conduct. Such conduct is against public policy and should not be 
condoned by the Court. The substantial hardship to Porter and public policy clearly 
outweigh any prejudice, if any, National might claim to have experienced. 
National's Attorney Should Have Been Required to Allocate Their Fees 
Between Fox and National. Following service of Porter's Amended Complaint upon 
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National, the law firm of Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley & Price ("Babcock") 
entered its appearance on behalf of National. Babcock had already been in the case 
representing Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") for over an entire year prior. 
When National filed its motion for attorney's fees, Babcock failed to separately allocate 
the time spent on its defense of National and Fox and sought through National's motion, 
to recover its attorney's fees for its unsuccessful defense of Fox. Additionally, an 
analysis of Babcock's invoice submitted in support of Mr. Price's Affidavit of Attorney's 
Fees demonstrates that National's motion sought to recover for attorney's fees billed by 
Babcock for work that was never completed and for unreasonable and excessive hours. 
Simply put, National sought to recover approximately $28,000 in attorney's fees for 
answering a complaint, taking a deposition and drafting a motion for summary judgment 
on a statute of limitations defense. 
Porter objected, but Judge Bohling granted an award of $25,000 plus costs. Porter 
still feels like this award was excessive and improper under the circumstances and as 
outlines in its memorandum in opposition to the request, which is incorporated herein. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT BY PORTER 
Porter asks this Court to (a) affirm the summary judgment against Fox, (b) 
authorize an award of additional attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal, 
(c) reverse the summary judgment in favor of National and against Porter, (d) reverse the 
award of attorney's fees to National, (e) in the alternative, require National's attorneys to 
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allocate their fees between work for Fox and work for National, and (f) if the summary 
judgment in favor of National is reversed and the summary judgment against Fox is 
affirmed, to direct that judgment be entered in favor of Porter and against National for the 
same amounts previously awarded to Porter, plus costs and fees. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 2004. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY PORTER CONSTRUCTION, dba 
PORTER & SONS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC., & 
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 000902201 
Before the Court are plaintiff's objections to defendant 
National Surety Corporation's ("NSC") proposed Order relating to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which the Court granted 
from the bench on April 29, 2002, following oral argument. 
Pursuant to the Court's request, counsel for NSC drafted the 
proposed Order, to which plaintiff objected. The proposed Order 
and the Objection thereto were submitted to the Court on May 9, 
2002. The Court writes independently to clarify the basis for its 
decision and resolve the Objections. 
According to the plaintiffs, defendant Fox Construction's 
("Fox") refusal to pay began prior to January 1998, and plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint asserts that the payment for the services for 
which plaintiff seeks recovery was past due as of February 11, 
1998. NSC objects to this date, as it was established by 
if% i 
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modifying deposition testimony which occurred after both the 
deadline allowed for making such modifications, and after the 
filing of the present Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the 
date is not material to the decision reached in this case, and 
thus, the Court adopts this date for purposes of this motion only. 
Plaintiff continued work on the project until approximately 
May 16, 1999. (See, Amended Complaint f 15.) On March 16, 2000, 
plaintiff filed this Complaint against Fox, seeking damages 
resulting from Fox's alleged failure to pay plaintiff for work 
performed on the University of Utah Women's Gymnastics facility on 
the University Campus. On January 12, 2 001, by motion, plaintiff 
sought leave to amend its Complaint adding NSC as a defendant, and 
adding a claim against the payment bond. On February 28, 2001, 
plaintiff's unopposed motion was granted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(4) provides that "(4) An action upon 
a payment bond . . . is barred if not commenced within one year 
after the last day on which the claimant performed the labor or 
service or supplied the equipment or material on which the claim is 
based." Based upon Fox's refusal to pay, Porter's cause of action 
upon the bond could have accrued under this section as early as 
February 11, 1998. Nevertheless, in resolving all reasonable 
inferences arising from the undisputed facts in favor of Porter, 
the Court construes May 16, 1999, the approximate date of the 
^ t a ^ N 
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completion of a 11 Porter's wo] L UII the project, as the date of 
accrual for its cause of action on the payment bond. "Thus, absent 
some liLsit in J "'v to relate the filing date of the amended 
complaint bach to the iiiing aate :i ir>. :*ri::inaj Coxnpi - i nt , or to 
toll the statute of limitations, the latest date upon which Porter 
could have 1 i J T :! it. 3rmplaint upon the bond is May 16, I'00 0, nine 
months prior to the filing of the Met J on i i Leo
 ( u t. 1 Je Amended 
plaintiff argues that the relation oaej. a:.:.:. * .. „~ . •.__•- '* ~f 
t'hCi 'an Rules of Ci':l Procedure is applicable; and second, t.t=r 
the ''discovery y^._- . ; • " -tute oi limitations a_Lso 
applies. 
I'urririo first to the relation bach doctrine, it is well-
estabiishect that the iiiiny ni n iTne.n;it'd "omplaint generally will 
relate baci; to the date of the filing of the original Conip.iii_.ijt 
oriJi wn^n the amendment does not add a new party. if, however 
party is added, but tno new emu "id p-.ifies arc "so closely related 
in their business operations that notice of the action against . ne 
strvtii: ] provide notice of the action to the other,11 then an 
exception applies, and relation bach iS - J love-1. [i,iZ, Wilcox i,< 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996) at 369; and Perry v. 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 ^Ltah 1984; at 213, To 
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determine whether this exception applies here requires an 
examination of the relationship between Fox and NSC. The identity 
of interest between these parties, as it turns out, is privity of 
contract. It is clear, as held in Perry, that such a relationship 
is an insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation back. 
Id. Thus, plaintiff's action in filing the claim adding NSC as a 
party does not relate back to the filing date of the original 
Complaint under Rule 15. 
Turning to the discovery rule, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1998), explained the rule 
as follows: 
Special situations exist in which the so-
called discovery rule tolls the running of the 
statute of limitations. Myers, 635 P.2d at 
86. The discovery rule is a judicially 
created doctrine under which the statute of 
limitation does not begin to run until the 
plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of 
the facts which give rise to the cause of 
action. The discovery rule functions as an 
exception to the normal application of a 
statute of limitation. 
...[t]he discovery rule does not apply to a 
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or 
damages and a possible cause of action before 
the statute of limitations expires. 
Accordingly, the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations 
unless plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action, 
n 
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or, alterna t j velyt plaintiff became- aware of his injuries or 
damages and a "possible11 cause of action before one s'Latuie 
expi red. 
To frame tr.coe. -. . ,r:;je;i: ~v ^"^Lies need to be 
considered: ore requires contractors peri orm. no state wor): to 
deliver both .-.avnent 5 - c pertrrmanee ooods zr security :: : ; . 
state, Utah Coae Ann. ;> I.U-M-I-JC; the o1 her provides that "any 
person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond upon 
payment of the cost rf reproduction of the bond and postage." Utah 
Code Ann., S €3-ob-19. Kead togethei , these statutes ^vTe 
plaintiff both notice of trie likelihood of the existence of a 
payment bond arid the procedure for obtaining a copy of the bond. 
Plaintiff concedes that he was aware that there \J as or should 
have oeen a payment bond or ire project as early ci Air: . 1999. 
Nevertheless, ^e^u.tt- : . 1 ^ • r c c : "'' • s-=tctorv rroceoure for 
oota.nino a 1: p y it :- rone, neitner p : . r : r -.pr: _*-.>_-_ a 
contractor, nor his counsel, ever availed themselves of this 
procedure. Mibtectd, plaintiff ;ish&1 Fcx for a copy of the bond in 
April and May, 1999, without success, prior to cumiitenc J nu ;ii^  
action, and plaintiff's counsel left phone messages in June, 1000 
with a receptionist cu secretary :i f [ r~ identified owner of the 
project, but dropped the matter when the phone calls were not 
returned. In order to obtain a copy of the bond, plaintiff had 
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only to make a written request and include a check for an amount 
sufficient to cover copying and postage. The requirement of 
reasonable diligence, at a minimum, required plaintiff to at least 
do as much. In failing to do so, plaintiff may not avail itself of 
the discovery rule. 
The alternative exception is equally problematic for 
plaintiff. As described previously, plaintiff was aware of his 
injuries or damages as early as February, 1998, and was aware there 
should have been a bond as early as April 1999. As NSC argues, 
given plaintiff's admitted suspicions, plaintiff was at least aware 
of the "possibility11 if not the probability or even certainty of a 
cause of action against the payment bond before the statute had run 
on May 16, 2000. Accordingly, plaintiff plainly could have pled a 
cause of action against Fox on its bond or a doe surety company to 
avoid the running of the statute even without a copy of the bond in 
hand. Plaintiff did not do so. Even after receiving actual notice 
of the payment bond, plaintiff waited eight months before filing 
its Amended Complaint adding NSC as a party. 
It is undisputed that by May 16, 1999 plaintiff was aware of 
his injuries or damages, and equally plain that plaintiff was aware 
of a possible cause of action upon the payment bond prior to the 
May 16, 2000 statute of limitation deadline. Accordingly the 
discovery rule does not apply. 
I^W 
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For the i oregoijiy reasons , p] a intif f ' s claim, against NSC is 
barred under m e staute cr j .iri.tatiuns such that .n'S. . .- -_:.t-: .-a 
to i^oco-r~~ ' ' ~atter rf "."-v.*. In view ci these determinations. 
IT IS HEREBY QRDLr^ , ^.It:^!.: VKZ :--""-?. m a t rne Morion of 
defendant NSC for Sur.r^ry Judgment, under r^ie 16(c) of thv ' ta'i 
Rule. . ' ""--.-eaure shsii r-~ and is hereby granted, and tr.st 
all claims and causes of :._;__:. i ^ ^ ^ e "tiff against 
defendant N.c 7 . n r:c Amended Complaint snail no and are hereby 
dismissed in their ent'retvf with prejudice. This constitutes the 
final Order of the Court on the mat Lei s referenced herf;n. No 
further Order need be prepared. 
Dated :..- I f> Cc- - •' ."..".y, 2002. 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
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Plaintiffs, Gary Porter Construction, dba Porter & Sons ("Porter"), Motion for Relief from Summary 
Judgment Granted in Favor of Defendant National Surety Corporation ("Motion") came on for hearing on 
the 22nd day of October, 2002, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling, 
Judge of the Third District Court. Defendants were represented by their attorneys of record Jeffery R. Price 
and Michael E. Bostwick of BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. Plaintiff Porter was represented by its attorneys 
of record Brian W. Stefffensen and Damian E. Davenport of STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE. The court 
000902201^°™"^ JD \ - \ fe f i 
having heard argument of counsel on the issues, and having reviewed the file, makes and enters the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The case of Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App. 247, is not controlling in this situation. The relationship 
between National and Fox Construction lacks the necessary identity of interest in order for the Rule 15 
relation-back doctrine to apply. As such, Porter's Motion is denied. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 mid Dixie State Bankv. Bracken, 764P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), 
National is awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $25,000.00. As a matter of law7, there is 
nothing in the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees which is false. Utah law is states that no apportionment is 
necessary when the facts are inextricably intertwined. The facts in this case are inextricably intertwined in 
this case, therefore, no apportionment is necessaiy between Fox Construction and National Surety 
Corporation ("National"). It was the role of the surety, National, was required to defend the action when 
Fox could not. 
hi summary, National is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff Porter in the amount of: 
$25,000.00 Attorneys' fees and costs 
together with post-judgment interest at the legal rate as provided from the date of the judgment until paid, 
plus after-accruing costs, and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise. 
DATED this ci_ day o f p f W - - * , 2002,. 
Judge William B. Bo? 
